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Abstract. Over the past few decades, the complex process of globalization has dissolved the traditional concept of 
state sovereignty and neutralized the clear distinction between national and international law. Thus, legal 
scholarship has formulate alternative conceptual schemes to frame the fragmentation of the new global legal order. 
In the paper, I focus on the two typically antithetical approaches of legal pluralism and global constitutionalism. 
Legal pluralism emphasizes the diversity and the multiplicity of the global legal realm, while global 
constitutionalism is traditionally related to concepts of unity and hierarchy, whose paradigmatic reference is the 
state. The aim of the inquiry is to establish a theoretical basis and provide the conceptual tools to reconcile the two 
opposite approaches, fi rst describing the main traits of each model, and then hypothesizing a hybrid model of 
plural constitutionalism. In the end, I will raise the question, from a constitutional but open point of view, whether 
it is really worth continuing to adopt a constitutional prospect. Alternative models (the GAL approach, for instance) 
may provide more suitable solutions for the complexity of the global legal world. However, a multiple model that 
attempts to reconcile different approaches, in correspondence to the multiplicity of the current global society, 
could be the best option.
Keywords: legal pluralism, global constitutionalism, plural constitutionalism, global governance, globalization, 
global administrative law
1. Introduction
Over the past few decades, the complex process of globalization1 has caused radical changes 
in today’s legal world. Economic, cultural, political, social and migratory globalizing forces 
have dissolved the central power of the nation state into several sites of authority2 around 
the world, and have diluted it to such an extent to undermine the traditional concept of state 
sovereignty. Inevitably, the classic categories national law/international law have become 
increasingly blurred and are not able to include anymore all the different manifestations of 
law in the world society.
* Ph.D. Candidate in Comparative Law, Department of Criminal and Comparative Law, 
University of Florence, Piazza di San Marco, 4 - 50121 Firenze, Italy.
E-mail: lucrezia.palandri@unifi .it
1 The term “globalization” bears a negative ideological connotation since it has been overused, 
too often associated to politics–in the opposition between the two confl icting movements global/no-
global, in the economic imperialism of the multinationals, in the G8 riots. However, it is useful 
because it manages to evoke the idea of the demise of national borders, which become porous and 
allow a continuous osmosis of values, behaviours, rules, tastes, habits, customs, which characterizes 
the post-Westphalian age.
2 From now on, I will use “sites of authority” and “regulatory regimes” as equivalent terms to 
describe the current division of power in the global space, resulting from the spreading of the central 
power of the nation states.
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Thus, legal scholarship has sought to formulate alternative conceptual schemes that 
could frame the complexity and the fragmentation of the new global3 legal order.
The paper chooses to focus on two of the leading theoretical explanations, typically 
outlined by legal scholars as quite distinct, even antithetical approaches, situated at the 
opposite poles of the constitutional debate: legal pluralism, a concept that confronts and 
respects the diversity and the multiplicity of the global legal realm, and global 
constitutionalism, traditionally related to concepts of unity and hierarchy, whose 
paradigmatic reference is the state.
The aim of the paper is to establish a theoretical basis, and provide the conceptual 
tools to square the opposite ideas of pluralism and constitutionalism in a global context, 
fi rst analysing the guiding lines according to which each model means to order the global 
legal society (sec. 2, sec. 3), and then hypothesizing how those models may be compatible, 
even interconnected, converging from opposite poles towards a middle way, a hybrid type 
of plural constitutionalism, or constitutional pluralism4 (sec. 4). Meanwhile, I have to 
necessarily mention the crucial catalyst role of national highest courts, regional courts, 
3 To avoid misunderstandings, some terminological specifi cations are necessarily required. 
Global is the most commonly used term to refer to the law of the current world society. It differs from 
the term international because global encompasses the different types of law of the contemporary 
time. In this context, the term international law, coined by Jeremy Bentham to indicate the 
relationships between sovereign states, is to be avoided. Alternative terms are universal law, world-
wide law (especially from French scholars, droit mondial) and transnational law. The term 
transnational does not merely identifi es an autonomous legal order emerged across the borders of the 
national state, a distinct space of global governance with no relation to the model of States; the 
transnationality is not something we can observe in the empirical facts, but represents a conceptual 
construction, an artefact to delineate a space apt to the new global legal dynamics; Zumbansen, P.: 
Carving out Typologies and Accounting for Differences Across Systems: Towards a Methodology of 
Transnational Constitutionalism. In: M. Rosenfeld, M.–Sajó, A. (eds): The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law. Oxford, 2012. 77 ss. The terms regional or supranational are 
referred to international organizations, like the European Union, but if we use the term supranational 
instead of international, it means that we want to stress the cooperative character of the organization 
whose we are dealing with; Cassese, S.: I tribunali di Babele. I giudici alla ricerca di un nuovo ordine 
globale. Roma, 2009; Id., Il diritto amministrativo globale: una introduzione. Rivista trimestrale di 
diritto pubblico, 44 (2005) 2, 331–357. It is worth recalling the distinction by Maria Rosaria Ferrarese 
between traditional law, intended both as national law and as international law, and the novel law 
without borders, embodied in the supranational law and the transnational law. While the 
supranational law has its origin from a political will, from a State, but soon it crosses its borders, the 
transnational law does the opposite: it has its origin in the global space, as response to the new 
demands of globalization, to functional differentiation of the legal order, and remains unbound (cf. 
sec. 3 p. 6 note 27), without a political will and a state anchor. Ferrarese, M. R.: Diritto sconfi nato. 
Roma–Bari, 2006. 
4 This theory can be developed from two different starting points: plural constitutionalism 
describes those strands of the global constitutionalism literature that take into account the pluralism of 
the global legal order; the locution constitutional pluralism, instead, underlines the continuum, the 
progression from the recognition of the contemporary pluralistic world, through the acceptance of the 
theory of legal pluralism, to its peculiar contribute to the evolution of the model assigning 
constitutional quality to the pluralistic world.
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international courts, and other bodies with a judicial or quasi-judicial nature, in shaping all 
those models.5
Lastly, I will raise the question, from a constitutional but open point of view, whether 
it is really worth continuing to adopt a constitutional prospect. Alternative models (the GAL 
approach, for instance) may provide more suitable solutions for the complexity of the global 
legal world. However, at the end, a multiple model that attempts to reconcile different 
approaches, in correspondence to the multiplicity of the current global society, could be the 
best option.
2. The model of legal pluralism6 
The different strands of the current literature on legal pluralism share the preliminary 
assumption that clashes among multiple, overlapping legal systems are unavoidable, and 
sometimes might be even desirable. In fact, legal pluralism is a common condition, 
recurring in history: a rich legal pluralism characterized Europe in the medieval period, and 
the common law tradition has always been characterized by a pluralistic nature.
Today, pushed by the centrifugal forces of globalization,7 pluralism has re-emerged 
after having been swept away by the consolidation of state power in the 19th century.
This newest notion of legal pluralism has started to be developed since the end of 
World War II, fi rst by legal anthropology and legal sociology, and then by comparative law, 
international law, and socio-legal studies. It is still a major topic in legal literature, and each 
discipline identifi es many different understandings of this term. Such a wide and general 
5 The paper embraces the idea of judicial activity as a form of dialogue. Judicial dialogue is a 
vague and comprehensive concept, and may describe different scenarios: judges, involving also other 
judicial actors (quasi-judicial bodies, NGOs, private parties, lawyers, groups of experts, panel 
systems, human rights organizations, etc.) cite each other’s decisions, looking beyond their own 
borders, even when they are not formally compelled to do so, engage in transnational cooperation, but 
also attend conferences, have face-to-face meetings, and generally become increasingly aware of 
transnational legal developments. Among all of these dialogical events, the paper chooses to consider 
just the narrow notion of dialogue as the tendency of national (constitutional and supreme), 
supranational, and international courts to refer to each other’s decisions in their adjudicatory activity.
6 An inquiry on the defi nition of legal pluralism could be the object of an autonomous, more 
exhaustive research, which is beyond the scope of the present paper, but which I would like to 
undertake soon. I suggest an essential bibliography: Teubner, G.: “Global Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism 
in the World Society. In: Teubner, G.: Global Law Without A State. Dartmouth, 1997; Merry, S. E.: 
New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational Law. Law and Social Inquiry, (2006) 31, 
975; Berman, P. S.: The New Legal Pluralism. Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences, 5 (2009), 
225; Griffi ths, J.: What is Legal Pluralism? Journal of Legal Pluralism, (1986) 24; Delmas-Marty, M.: 
Les forces imaginantes du droit (II): Le pluralisme ordonné. Seul, Paris, 2006; Bobbio, N.: entry 
Pluralismo. In: Bobbio, N.–Matteucci, N.–Pasquino, G.: Il dizionario di politica. Torino, 2004.
7 It is worth noting that globalization has unleashed centripetal forces, too. Robertson uses the 
term glocalization to mean the mutual contamination between centrifugal and centripetal forces, local 
and global trends. Globalization has produced a double direction movement: global law absorbs 
specifi c rules from each single legal orders through a bottom-up approach (universalization), and 
global law permeates each single legal orders through a top-down approach (de-nationalization). 
Robertson, R.: Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity. In: Featherston, M.–Lash, 
S.–Robertson, R.: Global Modernities. London, 1995. 
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concept requires an immediate clarifi cation about the meaning that I intend to adopt in this 
work.
In 1986, in his seminal work What is Legal Pluralism?, John Griffi ths summarized and 
consolidated the results of the legal pluralist scholars achieved until then, and provided the 
basic defi nition of legal pluralism as “the presence in a social fi eld of more than one legal 
order”.8 Radically anti-statist and anti-positivist, Griffi ths affi rmed that “Legal pluralism is 
the fact. Legal centralism is a myth, an ideal, a claim, an illusion”.9 He draws on the idea of 
ubi societas, ibi ius10 by Santi Romano.11
For the purposes of this paper, I will share Griffi ths’ anti-statist position. However, I 
will not adopt here his sociological and anthropological classic point of view, as it limits the 
object of inquiry to the relations between “multiple layers of law, usually with different 
sources of legitimacy, that exist within a single state or society”.12 Rather, I intend to adhere 
to those theories that apply a pluralist framework to the global scenario, in order to 
conceptualize “a world of hybrid legal spaces, where a single act or actor is potentially 
regulated by multiple legal or quasi-legal regimes”.13 This kind of legal pluralism doctrine 
seeks to provide a more realistic alternative to the two traditional theories that interpret the 
legal world either as a structure of formal state-to-state relations or as an overarching 
framework of universal norms like in a sort of Hobbesian cosmopolitanism.
The goal of the model of legal pluralism is to observe and describe the global legal 
space–regulated by a system of global governance–,14 and realize its condition of profound 
fragmentation, respecting and preserving it, and at once bringing to light a both internal and 
external systemic coherence.
Trying to outline the results of the studies on fragmentation, one could say that the 
pluralist theorists consider fragmentation essentially from two different points of view. On 
the one hand, fragmentation can be understood as a multi-layered fragmentation, along a 
vertical axis composed by the States, the supranational or regional bodies, and the 
international organizations. It is a fragmentation across different levels of governance, from 
  8 Griffi ths: op. cit. 1.
  9 Ibid. 4.
10 Romano, S.: L’ordinamento giuridico. Pisa, 1918.
11 The current concept of legal pluralism is the outcome of the legacy of the past combined with 
more recent developments connected to the process of globalization. We are witnessing to the re-
emergence of a social condition which is very similar in its dynamics to the medieval world. It has 
revived the idea that law cannot be separated from society, as law is already written in the social 
“tissue” (Harding, S.: Courts in Context. In: Annuario di Diritto Comparato e di Studi Legislativi. 
Quaderni 1, Napoli, 2012) so that it does not have to do anything else but mirror it (See also Grossi, 
P.: L’Europa del diritto. Roma–Bari, 2009). And, as a matter of fact, society cannot be totally 
identifi ed with state, then law has to recognize its plural character.
12 Olgiati, V.: entry Pluralism, Legal. In: Clark, D. S.: Encyclopedia of Law and Society: 
American and Global Perspectives. Thousand Oaks (CA), 2007.
13 Berman, P. S.: Global Legal Pluralism. Southern California Law Review, 80 (2007), 1155.
14 The concept of governance can be defi ned as “the process through which the rules systems in 
place in any social setting are adapted to the needs and purposes of those who live under them”. Stone 
Sweet, A.: Judicialization and the Construction of Governance. Comparative. Political Studies, 32 
(1999) 2, 147; or “the social mechanism by which the rules in place in any given community are 
adapted to the experiences and exigencies of those who live under them”. A. Stone Sweet: 
Judicialization and Construction of Governance. In: Shapiro, M.–Stone-Sweet, A.: On Law, Politics 
and Judicialization. Oxford, 2002. 55.
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global, through international, supranational, and fi nally domestic spheres. On the other 
hand, fragmentation can be intended as a segmentation in a wide range of single regulatory 
regimes, placed side by side or overlapping on a horizontal plane in the global sphere, each 
exercising recognizably public governance functions.
In this paper, I prefer to adopt, instead, one single point of view confronting the 
fragmentation of the global space as a whole: a vision from a panoramic viewpoint, from 
the top of a hill, that can grasp the plurality of legal orders, put all on the same level, like 
“islands” in the sea,15 connected through bridges, approaching or overlapping like driven by 
a plate tectonics.
Moreover, what is stressed by the theorists of legal pluralism is not merely multiplicity 
or diversity, but rather the absence of a set hierarchical model of interaction and the lack of 
an overarching unity. Also, to remain consistent with the character of absence of hierarchy, 
in the paper I choose not to deal with my issue distinguishing between the European 
dimension and the international one. An analysis of legal pluralism and global 
constitutionalism, fi rst in the European Union, and then in the global context, could be 
misleading and bring back to a perspective of hierarchical multi-level protection, involving 
well-known mechanisms of primacy, direct effects and counter-limits. I prefer to envisage 
the global dimension as a horizontal, moving, dynamic structure, where a multiplicity of 
actors and different sites of authority exercise those public powers that tend to escape the 
exclusive state control. States, supranational organizations, international organizations, 
hybrid public-private and purely private “self-creating or unoffi cial”16 bodies, share public 
power in several matters such as trade, investments, environment, fi shing, sport, aviation, 
security, agriculture, food, media, Internet, weapons, fi nancial crisis, terrorism, labour, 
refugees, pharmaceutical products. Regulatory roles often overlap. In several areas there is 
more than one regulatory authority, each one with different jurisdiction, and this leads, in 
turn, to the institution of further bodies to coordinate them.
The world society is subject to a real sectorialization. Accordingly, the regulatory 
disciplines cannot follow a single model, effective for each sector, but they have to vary 
according to specifi c needs, to the functions to be performed sector by sector. Pluralism is 
an unavoidable and irreversible consequence of the functional differentiation: while at the 
national level the principle of separation of powers regulates the relations between the 
organs of the state, at the global level it is at most a criterion of division of functions that 
operates.17 The sectorialization of the system–the specifi city of each regime, as well as the 
differentiation of the rule-makers–is refl ected also by the inequality of the guarantees 
available for the individuals: the disciplines of each sphere present a diversifi cation in the 
substance of their contents, indeed rights guaranteed in one of these regulatory spheres are 
not directly the same in other spheres.18
15 “In the sea of globality there are only islands of constitutionality” see Teubner, G.: 
Constitutionalising Polycontextuality. Modern Law Review, 73 (2010).
16 Cassese, S.: Global Administrative law: An Introduction. 2005. 22.
17 Global governance seems to go back to the states’ formative experience of “polysynody” 
(Ibidem), when they used to divide competences between different collegial organs. Here is another 
instance of the familiar recurring condition of legal pluralism in history. 
18 Cassese, S.: La funzione costituzionale dei giudici non statali. Dallo spazio giuridico globale 
all’ordine giuridico globale. Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, 3 (2007), 609 ss; Dupuy, P. M.: A 
Doctrinal Debate in the Globalisation Era: On the “Fragmentation” of International Law. European 
Journal of Legal Studies, (2007) 1, 2 ss.
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Furthermore, multiplication of judicial bodies, together with an increasing body of 
case law, is overlapping and accumulating (juridifi cation; judicial ubiquity19). It follows 
diversity in the substance and also in the enforcement of rights. The process of enforcement 
of rights establishes many different degrees of protection, for at least three main reasons: 
fi rstly, each sectoral regime decides on the establishment of judicial bodies so it happens 
that regimes with a court co-exist with regimes that do not have it; secondly, when judicial 
bodies are established, they can present a different degree of maturation and effectiveness; 
lastly, so there are different regulatory regimes dealing with the same sector as there are 
different dispute settlement bodies.
Relentlessly, fragmentation multiplies as if we saw it through a kaleidoscope.
Nonetheless, it is not a chaos since each regime is not ab-solutus: according to the 
pluralist scholars, there is a continuous compenetration between the various regulatory 
regimes (e.g. between the rules of the special regimes and the general international law, 
between the law of the member states of European Union and the Union law, etc.). On the 
contrary, some theorists of fragmentation have depicted those sites of authority as self-
contained, self-enclosed, and self-referential regimes, a sort of isolated and self-suffi cient 
monads, with no compenetration, asserting that each system is independent from the general 
normative framework constituted by the international legal order and act in a “clinical 
vacuum”.20
In sum, the theory of legal pluralism “is not just an external description of the 
constitutional landscape, but is corroborated and reinforced by the deepest role self-
understanding of the key actors themselves”.21  Legal pluralism involves the commitment to 
the common recognition and accommodation of the diverse parts notwithstanding their 
diversity. This is the crucial factor that distinguishes pluralism from plurality: the plurality 
remains mere plurality when the different sites of authority are conceived of as separated, 
fragmented in self-enclosed and self-referential regimes. Instead, the plurality turns into 
pluralism whether the different expressions of public power are considered connected to 
each other22 and the actors of this plurality are conscious that their own existence depends 
on their reciprocal relationships.
19 Ferrarese, M. R.: Diritto sconfi nato. Inventiva giuridica e spazi nel mondo globale. Bari–
Roma, 2006.
20 See the WTO Appellate Body Report 29 April 1996. 9; Marceau, G.: A Call for Coherence in 
International Law–Praises for the Prohibition Against “Clinical Isolation”. WTO Dispute Settlement 
Journal of World Trade, 33 (1999) 5, 87–152.
21 Walker, N.: The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism. EUI Working Paper LAW, (2002) 1.
22 Ferrarese, M. R.: Prima lezione di diritto globale. Roma–Bari, 2012. 10.
Cf also Romano: op. cit. The second part of Romano’s book is entitled “The plurality of the legal 
orders and their relationships”: it is interesting to notice that Romano, after having realized the 
plurality of the legal orders, considers appealing that a jurist deals also with the reciprocal relationships 
and interactions between such legal orders, their mutual indifference or recognition, and identifi es the 
essence of pluralism in its ordering nature, its interdependence, its dynamic and living condition.
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3. The model of global constitutionalism
The international legal order, or the system of global governance, grows up spontaneously, 
not according to a plan or a political will (political scientists talk about “governance without 
government”23), indeed, even if it had its origin in the states, it has become increasingly less 
dependent on them. Consequently, it appears plausible to whom conceives the constitution 
as consistent to the traditional domestic model, that the global legal order does not rest on 
any constitutional basis.24
In which sense, then, can we talk about a global constitutionalism?
The concept of global constitutionalism is not universally undisputed, and raises 
skepticism among many scholars. It is not easy to overcome the variety of global 
constitutionalism literature and the terminological ambiguity to seek and formulate a more 
straightforward concept of global constitutionalism in order to provide, at least, a common 
platform to debate it.
Traditionally, the roots of global constitutionalism go back to the post World War II 
period, when many countries around the world adopted constitutions or bills of rights and 
established forms of judicial review. The basic function of constitutionalism, deeply 
dependent on the existence of a written and entrenched constitution put into place by the 
pouvoir constituant, consists in keeping politics in check and limiting the government, in 
full compliance with the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances. 
Therefore, constitutionalism is essential for the survival of democracy, as the opposite is 
true as well, that democracy is fundamental for the existence itself of constitutionalism.25 
Then, the quality “global” identifi es the tendency of a domestic notion, that one of 
constitutionalism, to become common to many countries all over the world.
Thus, in its original phase,26 global constitutionalism was still tightly tied to the idea of 
modern nation state, but soon constitutional features would gradually begin to emerge in 
the international legal order, specifi cally in the context of supranational arrangements, like 
23 Rosenau, J. N.–Czempiel, E.-O.: Governance without Government: Order and Change in 
World Politics. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, (1992) 20.
24 Typically, there could be no constitutional discourse without a political community as its 
object of representation and source of legitimation.
25 Concerning the iterative relationships between constitutionalism and democracy, see, e.g. 
Walker, N.: Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: An Iterative Relationship. 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper, (2010) 25; Ferrarese, M. R.: When National 
Actors Become Transnational: Transjudicial Dialogue between Democracy and Constitutionalism. 
vol. 9 Iss. 1 (Frontiers), Article 2, Global Jurist, 2009. 
26 Part of the academic literature agrees on the distinction of the development of the concept of 
global constitutionalism in three phases, which can be called the “three C’s” in global constitutionalism: 
C1 stands for Constitution; C2 for Constitutionalisation; and C3 refers to Constitutionalism as a novel 
concept. See Weiner, A.–Lang, A. F.–Jr. Tully, J.–Maduro, M. P.–Kumm, M.: Global Constitutionalism: 
Human Rights, democracy and the rule of law. 1 Global Constitutionalism, Cambridge, 2012. Another 
distinction which is relevant to those scholars who consider constitution as a process rather than a 
thing (see p. 7): big C and small C constitutions. The formal–written, or big C–constitution is not the 
whole of the constitution but it is complementary with the small C constitutional culture. The small C 
constitution, the constitutional culture, is a product of the patterns of behaviour within a community. 
Gardbaum, S.: The Place of Constitutional Law in the Legal System. In: Rosenfeld, M.–Sajó, A. 
(eds): op. cit. 170 ss.
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the European Union (EU), and other international organizations, such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN).
Once this process is started, it is not diffi cult to gather how much the concept of global 
constitutionalism has quickly changed in the current constitutional debate.
Originally, global constitutionalism described the worldwide spreading of typically 
national circumstances, something deeply bound to the state model, but then it appeared 
less and less tied to national borders, and progressively ceased to identify a clear-cut 
phenomenon and became an empty box, a theoretical framework through which legal 
scholarship tried to interpret what was happening on the global fi eld. A proper global 
constitutional project has now developed as a sort of umbrella notion which covers a broad 
range of theories seeking to observe and interpret the international dimension through 
constitutional lenses. These theories have quite different scopes, some just explaining, 
describing, and mapping, others also shaping and formulating concrete proposals, still 
others trying to do both; and their fi eld of observation also varies from the global domain as 
a whole to specifi c institutional contexts.
According to these theories, constitutionalism has gone through a paradox: de facto it 
moves beyond national borders and emancipates itself from nation states, but de iure it 
remains “unbound”,27 without any formal anchorage or legitimacy. To fi ll this void, global 
constitutionalists have developed many different explanations, all starting from the 
assumption that there are empirical signs and indicators that the international legal order, 
although pluralistic in structure, is going through a process of “constitutionalization”.28
Most of global constitutionalist approaches do nothing else but uncritically transfer the 
state paradigm to the global society. Among those, the one we could refer to as proper 
global constitutional approach,29 emphasizes, as a reaction against and a response to 
fragmentation, the existence of an overarching constitutional framework encompassing the 
entire global legal system, and assumes a high level of global consensus on shared ethical 
values.
This monolithic approach to global constitutionalism varies from some versions that 
claim an institutional constitutional order–the constitution of the European Union, or the 
United Nation’s world order constitution,30–to others that advocate an informal 
constitutionalisation, a “constitutionalisation of international law”,31 based on a “higher law 
27 Wiener, A.: Constitutionalism Unbound: A Practice Approach to Normativity. Paper prepared 
for presentation at the round-table “Practice, Ethics and Normativity”, Annual Millennium Conference 
Out Of The Ivory Tower. Weaving the Theories and Practice of International Relations, London 
School of Economics and Political Science, 22–23 Oct 2011; see also note 3 p. 2.
28 Cass, D. Z.: The “Constitutionalization” of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-
Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade. EJIL, 12/1, 2001. 
39–75; Bryde, B. O.: Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts und Internationalisierung des 
Verfassungsrechts. Der Staat, 42 (2003), 62–75.
29 For the further distinction between global constitutionalist approach and transnational 
constitutionalist approach, see MacDonald, E.–Shamir-Borer, E.: Meeting the Challenges of Global 
Governance: Administrative and Constitutional Approaches, Discussion Draft, 2008, available at 
http://iilj.org/courses/documents/MacDonald.Shamir-Borer.92508.pdf.
30 Fassbender, B.: The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International 
Community. Columbia Journal of International Law, 36 (1998), 529, 573 ss.
31 De Wet, E.: The International Constitutional Order. International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 55, 2006. 51–76.
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constitution”,32 or a “multi-tiered system of governance founded on higher law 
constitutionalism”.33 Both of those monistic strands, however, have in common closure and 
a tendency towards a new reduction to unity, that attempt to keep following the old familiar 
standard of a national constitution within a single hierarchically layered legal and political 
system.
This sort of constitutional theories are often constructed with reference to comparative 
constitutional law.34 Taking for granted for the moment that judicial bodies are the 
institutions that most contribute to order the global space,35 we could say that the 
constitutional function of judges is specular to the classic notion of constitution. A national 
constitution establishes governmental institutions, such as legislatures, executives, and 
courts, and grants them the power to make, apply, enforce, and interpret laws, and also 
indicates how the various institutions are expected to interact with one another. We can 
affi rm that judges have a constitutional function, though not depending on any formal 
constitutional mandate: such a strand of constitutional thinking is based on the idea of a 
material, substantial, not formal, constitution, considered more as a process rather than as a 
particular institutional form or structure. Post World War II constitutions usually contain 
also a catalogue of fundamental rights and liberties that is expected to be enacted by the 
legislative power, and establish procedures and institutions for protecting rights against 
political interference, typically in the form of judicial review (“higher law constitution”). 
Judicial bodies in the new global order have a constitutional function also concerning 
fundamental rights: they are engaged in a dialogue with foreign courts and interpret foreign 
constitutions, in doing so they create a common core of values and principles, a common 
frame of reference36 and establish a sort of jurisprudential circle of human rights, replacing 
an inactive legislator in giving protection to fundamental rights.
One more observation on the argumentation that derives from the historical double 
meaning of the term “constitution” as something defi ned that has already settled to represent 
a political community, but also as a dynamic and ongoing process that is developing over 
time in a dialectic evolution with the underlying community.37 Playing on the constitutive 
ambiguity of the term constitution itself, the potential elements against the idea of a global 
constitution can be simply interpreted as a proof of its rudimentary and embryonic nature, 
its “emerging”38 character, its function as premise and telos at the same time.
Also, according to this idea, UN, WTO, EU or other regional bodies can be defi ned as 
“constitutional” sites of authority. However, this claim is a double-edge sword since it hides 
some risks that could undermine the basis of this brand of global constitutional thinking: 
should the constitutional character of some of the entities that coexist in the global world be 
32 Stone Sweet, A.: Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regime. Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies, 16 (2009) 2, 630 ss.
33 Stone Sweet, A.: Judicialization and Construction of Governance. In: Shapiro–Stone Sweet: 
On Law, Politics and Judicialization. op. cit. 
34 Stone Sweet: Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regime. op. cit. 622.
35 See infra sec. 4, p. 9.
36 See note 40.
37 “A society forms its constitution to bear its identity. But it also forms its constitution to shape 
its identity”. Allott, P.: Eunomia: New Order for a New World. Oxford, 2001.
38 De Wet, E.: The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation 
of the Emerging International Constitutional Order. Leiden Journal of International Law, 19 (2006), 
611.
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viewed as an evidence, or even as a reference model, for a broader global constitutional 
system, or rather, on the contrary, are they indicative of the absence of any overarching 
constitutional order at the global level?
A sharper objection concludes that, if the object of global constitutionalism–a fully 
shaped global constitution–does not exist yet, this should be enough to persuade that a 
global constitution is just a speculative project, for some others even a totally unrealistic 
option.
Nonetheless, the major objection to a global constitutional framework is that such a 
model does not  refl ect, least of all respect, the pluralistic nature of the reality, rather tends 
to neutralize and negate it, driven by the ambition of an utopian reduction to unity, claiming 
to re-impose order and re-establish hierarchy.
4. Towards the middle way of Plural Constitutionalism
The global constitutionalism model outlined in the previous section seems to confi rm the 
view that “any measure of legal pluralism is inversely proportional to any measure of 
constitutional order”.39
The aim of the paper is to challenge this view and seek to reconcile pluralism and 
constitutionalism. Pluralism is an inevitable–it represents the conditions we are living–and 
a more desirable alternative to the pretending unity claimed by the global constitutional 
discourse,40 but also the idea implied in the concept of constitutionalism of “a single 
authorizing register for the political domain as a whole”41 is consistent with and necessary 
to the global society.
In the second part of the paper, I described the global legal world of today as a huge 
horizontal fi eld where many different players coexist, collide, and build linkages in mutual 
cooperation through an active dialogue. This plurality of orders on the same plane needs a 
39 Stone Sweet: Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regime. op. cit. 631, 
using this sentence just to contradict it.
40 The invocation of universal norms of human rights is used to to provide political legitimation 
in absence of a political centre. Human rights argumentation, considering their universal recognition 
and their evocative and symbolic appeal of universal topoi, is one of the most powerful ways to gain 
the adherence of the audience for an author. Human rights have the appearance of being able to 
transcend constitutionalism and act as a source of legitimation. But if at a general level we can agree 
that general values exist (but we could debated also on this assumption), when we apply those values 
to a concrete case they become immediately controversial, the problem is not that authoritative 
interpretative bodies for concretising putatively universal values expressed in HR are lacking, rather 
is that those values do not mean the same thing. Value diversity is insourmountable, and there is even 
the risk of a Western imperialism. Pluralism is an ethically preferable alternative to the unrealistic 
unity implied in global constitutional discourse. Constitutional pluralism is a better option as it 
satisfi es the substantial requirements, and refl ects the societal and private interests (Ferrarese: Prima 
lezione di diritto globale. op. cit.), closer to a sort of global technocracy that escapes from the 
traditional forms of top-down accountability related to the democratic mechanisms and that fi nds its 
legitimation in effectiveness, effi ciency, output [Goodwin, M. E. A.: Plugging the legitimacy gap? 
The ubiquity of human rights and the rhetoric of global constitutionalism. Rechtsfi losofi e und 
Rechtstheorie, 39 (2010) 3]
41 Walker, N.: Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context. RECON Online Working 
Paper, (2010) 3, 2.
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pragmatic architecture and conceptual tools to be properly understood. To this end, legal 
pluralism certainly recognizes an external normative coherence of the global order, 
identifying relatively stable relationships between the different sites of authority. Yet these 
interactions remain mere coincidences and contingent connections of distinct identities.
A step forward is made by more nuanced, “modest” strands of academic global 
constitutionalism literature, which could be called transnational constitutionalism 
approaches,42 and in particular by the theory of plural constitutionalism, or constitutional 
pluralism,43 mainly developed by Neil Walker.44
This theory aims at the reconciliation of plurality in constitutionally meaning terms. To 
this end, it goes through various stages. Firstly, constitutional pluralist scholars realize the 
pluralistic essence of the contemporary legal world, making use of the outcomes of the 
legal pluralism studies as a starting point. Secondly, they recognize to each non-state legal 
order its own independent constitutional claims, and respect every distinct constitutional 
site–national, supranational, international–. Thirdly, they provide a normative sense to the 
global space, recognizing not only single constitutional identities but also the proper 
constitutional quality of their mutual relationships. The cooperative dimension between 
constitutional units cannot be represented anymore either by the old Westphalian order of 
fully sovereign states, or by an equally fully sovereign global state with a global constitution 
that absorbs and replaces the existing different sites of authority, repositioning the one-
dimensional sovereign order. Constitutional pluralism provides an alternative interpretation 
of these connections, playing a crucial role in fostering the conditions under which these 
connections may occur, and thus progressively stabilizing them.
In this manner, the plurality of constitutional sites is embraced into a “constitutionally 
reconciled”45 legal space, although each site develops a constitutional quality in accordance 
with the particular traditions, social pressures and normative dynamics peculiar to that site 
itself. Indeed, there is a process of constitutionalisation but there is also the awareness that 
it is impossible to keep following the “reduction to unity” ambition of the traditional global 
constitutionalism.
We could try to imagine two opposing poles of a line: one is the fragmentation, which 
is legal pluralism to excess, the chaos; the other one is the global constitutionalism in its 
most radical expression that is a hierarchical overarching legal order, where every form of 
pluralism has been erased. These two extremes gradually loose part of their strong 
characterization when they start to converge. 
The line that links those two points is represented by plural constitutionalism. 
Therefore, plural constitutionalism, or constitutional pluralism if we start to “walk” from 
the pluralism extreme, is more a process of constitutionalisation, a double path that starts 
42 Supra note 29.
43 Supra note 4.
44 Walker, N.: The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism. EUI Working Paper LAW, (2002) 1, 26; 
Weiler, J. H. H. H.: The Constitution of Europe “Do The New Clothes Have an Emperor?” and Other 
Essays on European Integration. Cambridge, 1999; MacCormick, N.: Questioning Sovereignty? Law, 
State and nation in the European Commonwealth. Oxford, 1999; Kumm, M.: Who is the Final Arbiter 
of Constitutionality in Europe? Three Conceptions of the Relationship Between the German Federal 
Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice. Common market Law Review, 36 (1999), 
351–386.
45 Walker, N.: Reconciling MacCormick: Constitutional Pluralism and the Unity of Practical 
Reason. Ratio Juris, 24 (2011) 4.
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from two opposite poles and seeks to reach a middle way where pluralism and 
constitutionalism fi nd a balance.
Therefore, in the current constitutional debate, the issue at stake should concern how 
we can use the concept of constitutionalism, and not if we can use it or not (all or nothing).46 
Nowadays, there is no unitary template to decide whether constitutional status is achieved 
or not, but there are some criteria and standards in terms of which forms of constitutionalism 
can be distinguished and degrees of constitutionalisation can be identifi ed. Thus, many 
scholars have reassessed the strong concept of constitutionalism, elaborating substitute 
models such as of “lite”,47 or “compensatory”48 constitutionalism, or even viewing 
constitutionalism more as a “mindset”49 or a “sensibility”.50 As I argued in the third section 
of the paper, constitutionalism starts to become an empty box, when it goes beyond the 
national borders.
The idea of plural constitutionalism started to be shaped in the context of the studies of 
the constitutional dimensions of European Union. The European Union has been a kind of 
original “comfort zone”51 for the ideas of constitutional pluralism since the Union does 
appear to possess a constitutional character of sorts (the doctrine of primacy and direct 
effects; the governance institutional architecture), to have a material constitution–which is 
thinner, and not thicker as it would be if the formal European Constitution have been 
approved–, and to establish occasionally interactions with other constitutional identities 
(the member States).
The idea of plural constitutionalism, in particular, acquires an instant vividness and 
concreteness from the relationships between national–supreme and constitutional–courts 
and supranational courts. Courts have a crucial role: they are aware of deciding the specifi c 
concrete case, but also of acting in a broader context which their decisions contribute to 
built. They develop close structural and cultural connections (bridges, passerelle52) between 
the different regimes, and, according to those scholars who endorse the process of 
constitutionalisation, it is plausible that this judicial dialogue may be the key for the 
construction of properly constitutional relations.
The well-known Kadi judgement53 may well prove how judges are exerting a 
constitutional function, determining the relationships between the different legal layers, 
46 Parrish, A. L.: Storm in a Teacup: the U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law. University 
of Illinois Law Review, 13 (2007) 2, 640–642; Poiares Maduro, M.: Three Claims of Constitutional 
Pluralism. In: Avbelj, M.–Komarek, J.: Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond. 
Oxford Portland, 2012. 1.
47 Klabbers, J.: Constitutionalism Lite. International Organizations L.aw Review, (2004) 1, 32.
48 Peters, A.: Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental 
International Norms and Structure. Leiden Journal of International Law, 19 (2006), 579.
49 Koskenniemi, M.: Constitutionalism as a Mindset: Refl ections on Kantian Themes About 
International Law and Globalization. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, (2007) 8, 9.
50 von Bogdandy, A.–Dann, P.–Goldmann, M.: Developing the Publicness of Public International 
Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities. German Law Journal, 9 
(2008) 11.
51 Walker: Constitutional and Pluralism in Global Context. op. cit. 11.
52 The term is coined by Cassese: La funzione costituzionale dei giudici non statali. op. cit.
53 Kadi v. Council of European Union; Case C 402/05, delivered on January 18th 2008, available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J0402:EN:HTML. Briefl y, 
the facts. In 2008 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) overruled the decisions of the Court of First 
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here in particular between European Union law and international law. Kadi stands for a new 
“bottom-up”54 process in which a regional court, the European Court of Justice, tries to 
persuade the UN Security Council to change its policy towards fundamental rights.
Through this approach, which is very similar to the so-called “Solange stance”,55 
judges are building not a hierarchical, pyramidal order, according to a view related to the 
supremacy of a supranational order, rather they focus on the global dimension, and create a 
circular network with weak or even absent hierarchies56: a pyramid without its vertex.57
Then, the model of plural constitutionalism begins to be conceived also and most of all 
beyond the European context. We are witnessing the development of new transnational 
forms of constitutionalism driven by the functional specialism of the increasingly 
autonomous spheres of the global society (“societal constitutionalism”;58 “sectoral 
constitutionalization”59). Nonetheless, can we really state that the process of 
constitutionalisation of the global order is fully completed?
Instance of the European Communities and annulled the regulations of the Council of European 
Union implementing the resolutions of the UN Security Council that had placed Mr. Kadi, citizen of 
Saudi Arabia with important relations with the European Union, and the Al Barakaat International 
Foundation, based in Sweden, on the list whose funds were to be frozen on suspicion of fi nancing 
terrorism. The reason of the judgement is that the Court found a breach of fundamental rights 
guaranteed at the level of the European Union: the right to be heard, the right to property and the 
principle of proportionality, the right to an effective legal remedy/judicial review. The European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) reviews the validity of a Community act in the light of fundamental rights. This 
review “must be considered to be the expression, in a community based on the rule of law, of a 
constitutional guarantee stemming from the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal system which is not to 
be prejudiced by an international agreement” (para. 316). The European Court does not establish a 
new hierarchical structure regarding the interaction between international law and European law. 
Rather, the Court emphasizes the primacy of obligations under the UN Charter, but at the same time, 
by emphasizing the rule of law, states that the judicial review also covers all Community acts, even if 
they are designed merely to give effect to resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council. This is an 
approach of reciprocal concessions. If there were a real confl ict between obligations arising under the 
UN Charter on the one hand and EU fundamental rights as “principles that form part of the very 
foundations of the Community legal order” (para. 304) on the other, EU fundamental rights have to 
prevail. In his opinion, the former Advocate General of ECJ Miguel Maduro: “Measures which are 
incompatible with the observance of human rights […] are not acceptable in the Community”. Maduro 
stated, inter alia, that “the relationship between international law and the Community legal order is 
governed by the Community legal order itself, and international law can permeate that legal order 
only under the conditions set by the constitutional principles of the Community”.
54 Stewart, R. B.: US Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law? Law and 
Contemporary Problem, 68 (2005) 63.
55 The reference is obviously to the famous German Solange case. BverfGE 37, 271; 1974 2 
CMLR 540, (1974).
56 Image evoked by Antonio Ruggeri in his speech at the Annual seminar of Gruppo di Pisa 
“Sovranità statale, costituzionalismo multilivello e dialogo tra le corti”, Scilla, September 21, 2012.
57 Ost, F.–van de Kerchove, M.: De la piramide au réseau? Pour une théorie dialectique du 
droit. Faculté universitaires  de Saint-Louis, 2002. 
58 Teubner: op. cit.
59 Peters, A.: Membership in the Global Constitutional Community. In: Klabbers, J.–Peters, A.–
Ulfstein, G.: The Constitutionalization of International Law. Oxford, 2009. 153–263, 201–203.
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5. Some concluding remarks. Alternative proposals
In the previous section, I described plural constitutionalism both as an internal characteristic 
of the sites of authority and a structural external characteristic of their reciprocal 
relationships.
It is quite evident that the huge ambition of this model has not been able so far to 
manage the plurality and at the same time impose a “single authorizing register for the 
global society as a whole”.60
Some scholars have proposed a more systematic and encompassing constitutional 
framework.61 Also, this theory is subject to objections: rhetorical excess, infl ationary 
consequences devaluing the symbolic power of the term itself. Even so, Walker replies that 
“the label constitutional pluralism has been overused and overstretched […] but what it 
remains worth thinking about is the architecture of global law in constitutional terms”.62
However, a better option could be the different approach of global administrative law 
(GAL). Plural constitutionalism discourse remains overly limited in the institutional forms 
to which the constitutional character can be usefully applied,63 while the global 
administrative law is a similar approach but provides a necessary complement to it insofar 
as it encompasses all sites at which public power is exercised, not simply those that can be 
sensibly referred to as “constitutional”. But also GAL has some shortcomings: it could be 
exploited as a new tool for the pursuit of hegemonic interests or as a facade of legitimacy to 
the relations of domination already in existence.
Concluding, we could formulate another hypotesis: a model that attempts to put 
together more approaches, shifting from a line with two extreme ends to a triangle with 
moving and dynamic sides, following the model of the classifi cation of the legal systems by 
Ugo Mattei64.
Global governance could be conceived of as a porous space developed, fostered, 
sustained, mainly through judicial dialogue, by the application of principles and rules of the 
emerging global administrative law, complemented by a constitutional framework, in which 
the different actors–thick, thin and non-constitutional sites–will continue to coexist in a 
relation not of hierarchy but of heterarchy65, with the overall confi guration not of unity but 
rather of pluralism, and with advantages of a national system (predictability, certainty, 
stability) and those of a plural order (fl exibility, speed).
60 Supra, note 41.
61 Kumm, M.: The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between 
Constitutionalism in and beyond the State. In: Dunoff, J.–Trachtman, J. (eds): Ruling the World? 
Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance. Cambridge, 2009. 258–325; Krisch, 
N.: Global Administrative Law and the Constitutional Ambition. In: Dobner, P.–Loughlin, M.: The 
Twilight of Constitutionalism? Oxford, 2010. 245–266.
62 Walker: Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context. op. cit. 7.
63 See Walker: The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism. op. cit. 32 ss. to have an idea of what 
could be categories and indices of constitutionalism, what are, according to Walker, the features that 
distinguishes a constitutional sites from a non-constitutional sites.
64 Mattei, U.: Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal System. The 
American Journal of Comparative Law, (1997) 45.
65 Halberstam, D.: Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Confl ict in the European Union 
and the United States. In: Dunoff–Trachtman (eds): Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International 
Law and Global Governance. op. cit. 326–355.
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That being said, the heated debate concerning the idea of constitutionalism is not 
simply an intellectual challenge, constituting an end in itself, but is a pressing political 
challenge, anchored in the social and political world, that claims to give answers and 
purports to make a difference to that world. “Constitutional reasoning, like all legal 
reasoning, is a form of practical reasoning”66.
66 N. MacCormick, N.: Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Return of Practical Reason. 
Journal of Law and Society, 10 (1982), 1–18.
